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1 Introduction
‘Power need not learn.’1
The UN Millennium Project Report looks at what
is wrong with the aid system, including bilateral
aid from governments. It notes that such aid is
highly unpredictable, poorly targeted, frequently
tied, badly coordinated, driven by donor rather
than recipient objectives, influenced by the donor’s
geopolitical interests with resulting policy
incoherence and not systematically evaluated (UN
2005).Of this long list, it is with this last point that
the present article concerns itself. Why do donor
governments have problems with learning and how
can they help themselves do better?2
Carlsson and Wohlgemuth (2000) present the
following reasons why learning is difficult within
the aid relationship:
● Political constraints
● The unequal nature of the aid relationship
● Problems internal to the organisation of the aid
agency
● The organisations and capacities on the recipient
side
● Sources of knowledge and the quality of
information.
In the present article, a further reason is
proposed, connected to the unequal nature of the
aid relationship noted above. I build on an argument
made by Curtis (2004), namely the presence of a
mindset that seeks control through linear planning,
supported by the instruments of performance
management.
In exploring the question, I look at the world of
aid rather differently than does the Millennium
Project Report. It emphasises the need for more
strategies and coherent programming, I respond
that this is like recommending brandy as a cure for
a hangover. I suggest that donors have
overemphasised target orientation to the detriment
of relationships and that although working in and
contributing to a highly turbulent environment
where today’s “weak but willing” recipient becomes
tomorrow’s “corrupt government”, donors, as
powerful actors have always done, construct a
history of that environment that suits them to justify
future actions (Nietzsche 1873). They do not learn
from history, only abuse it.
As the rationale for aid is to support change for
the better, I am interested in why donor
governments appear to be ignoring the intellectual
developments of the last 20 or so years concerning
concepts of change, particularly complexity theory
and ideas about improvisation. Is it the absence of
an imperative?Organisational and systems learning
has developed within the for-profit sector. They
have learnt the danger of ‘the simplicity trap. By
ignoring the contradictions and paradoxes of their
environment, businesses are liable to “plot their
own demise”’ (Clegg et al. 2004: 487). In theory,
the public sector equivalent of business’ bottom
line are citizens to whom governments must learn
to respond to stay in power.
Even so,Whitehall, for example, is not very good
at learning. The political environment that shapes
public sector cultures is averse to experimentation,
requires negotiation and compromise between
competing power centres in government, suffers
from short-termism related to the electoral cycle
andmaintains traditions of control and secrecy that
stifle feedback (Chapman 2002; Common 2004).3
Nevertheless, the ballot box does help reality to
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break in. It is absent in the relation between donor
governments and the end users of aid.
In what follows, I look at the interplay between
accountability, learning and relationships. I suggest
that donors might be able to enhance their
performancemore through improvising rather than
through greater efforts at strategic control, and that
they can do this responsibly by strengthening their
accountability to all stakeholders in the aid system
through investing in relationships. I conclude with
some practical tips for action that donor
organisations could start trying straightaway. As
complexity theory tells us, small changes can have
big impacts.
2 Conceptual perspectives
“Good donorship” has been described as ensuring
recipient country leadership, providing support
for long-term capacity development, harmonisation
and simplification of procedures, transparency and
predictability of resources and subsidiarity as a
decision-making principle (ODI n.d.). Donors’
performance on these matters is currently patchy
and the research question as framed by New
Institutional Economics (NIE) concerns the
incentives that constrain or promote good
donorship.
This is a valuable and necessary agenda but one
I suggest not sufficient for achieving good
donorship. Recipient–donor relations are highly
complex with diverse networks of actors that could
mutually profit from illumination by a multitude
of understandings. To complement the NIE
approach offered by such astute analysts as Ostrom
et al. (2002), other perspectives can ‘thicken’ the
problem analysis, including a consideration of
history, power and the social production and
reproduction of meaning (culture) as fundamental
to understanding the aid relationship.
In addition to social anthropology and the study
of organisations, I suggest complexity theory can
help improve the management of the aid
relationship. Complexity theory postulates that
change is emergent. Organised efforts to direct it
more than partially confront the impossibility of
our ever understanding the totality of a system that
is in constant flux. Composed of innumerable
elements, continuously shaped and reformed
through interaction upon each other, the system is
constantly creating new elements that in turnmay
affect (loop back) and change those already in
existence. Thus, we cannot predict all the effects
that any of our actions may have on the wider
system, or indeed on ourselves as initiators of the
action. Small ‘butterfly’ actions may have a major
impact and apparently significant ones, very little.
The “default”meta-theory of donor governments
is one of order, rather than complexity. Based on
total certainty, complete rationality, predictability
and linked causes and effects, it contrasts with
complexity theory that suggests that all of these
may possibly be partially but never completely
achievable (Geyer 2003). Complexity theory
provides a way of thinking about social change and
our role in it that embraces rather than ignores or
tries to solve paradoxes, of which there are many
in the aid relationship. Staying “open to paradox”
suggests improvisation as themost effective action.
As in jazz, the players have a shared idea of what
they might play but through the interaction of the
instruments as they perform (and each time it is
different) so the score becomes that lived reality
rather than that determined in advance (Clegg et
al. 2004). The audience judges the performance by
what they actually hear.A fundamental ingredient
for good jazz is the quality of trust between the
members of the band.Whom you play with shapes
your product.
Including these other perspectives of course
makes life less simple. Recommendations tend to
be tentative, less precise, or contradictory.None of
these are attractive to a bureaucratic mode of
organisation that quintessentially favours clarity,
order and predictability – heading straight for the
target on the assumption of cause–effect linearity.
However, I shall argue that this bureaucratic
predilection (which is of course frequently breached
in the practice as distinct from the stated policy) is
itself adonor weakness when it leads to constructing
the world as it would like it to be, risking ignoring
how it might appear to others.
Fortunately, the global revolution in
communications and the macrosocietal
developments associated with it (Castells 1997) is
having repercussions in the world of bureaucratic
order.Other people’s realities are breaking in.Old
certainties have disappeared. These changes are
affecting how the public sector does its business
both at home and abroad. Fresh ideas from a variety
of disciplines, including those already cited, are
informing organisational learning and
understandings of policy processes.4 Some of these
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are beginning to influence our thinking about the
aid relationship (Carlsson andWohlgemuth 2000;
Biggs and Smith 2003; Pasteur 2004; Groves and
Hinton 2004; McGee 2004). Their message is that,
while it may be impossible to have a total grasp of
the complexity of our global society, each of us has
at least some understanding. These varieties of
understanding can in dialogue shape responsible
policy, one negotiated by respecting difference,
where those involved appreciate that there aremany
ways of understanding the world and its problems.
This approach carries implications for accountability
within the aid relationship that I shall now explore.
3 Accountability between
governments
The aid relationship is characterised by a concept
of contract, particularly as understood from the
donor side, by entitlement, particularly as
understood from the recipient side, and by gift
exchange, as perceived by both parties (Eyben with
León, forthcoming).This mix of characteristics and
different points of view concerning the content and
purpose of the relationship is likely to lead to less
than full agreement concerning either the normative
(values and beliefs) or the procedural aspects of
accountability arrangements. In the culturally and
politically diverse world of the aid relationship,
stakeholders may have very different moral
perspectives on what it means to be accountable
and what makes a quality relationship (Bagic 2004).
Even within a single organisation, differences in
power relations and values may impede
communication and unity of purpose. Apparent
agreements may be a reflection of processes that
have been described as “colonisation” and “de-
coupling”, to which I return later.
At the Monterrey conference on Financing for
Development the “international community”
concluded there were the makings of a new
development partnership based on a framework of
mutual accountability between developed and
developing countries (IMF 2002). Sanctions are
imposed if accounts are not rendered in contractual
and entitlement relationships. The lack of such
sanctions leads some to argue (e.g. a number of staff
interviewed in SIDA) that “accountability” is a
misnomer as applied to aid relations, making a
mockery of responsibility if irresponsibility goes
unpunished. At Monterrey, recipients pledged to
practise good government and donors to provide
sufficient resources. There was an understanding
on the donor side that they would cut aid if the
recipient did not meet its side of the bargain, but
the Department for International Development’s
(DFID’s)Fragile States Policy Paper (2005) discusses
the problems if such a sanction were applied – those
most needing aid would no longer receive it. Inmy
conclusion, I point to this paper’s recommendations
as a good example of an improvised solution to a
paradox that has been recognised rather than
ignored.
The incapacity of recipients to apply sanctions
on donors should the latter break the Monterrey
agreement, confirms that the primary relationship
is that of a gift governed by morality and solidarity
but not by law.5 That donors cannot be forced to
behave responsibly may be one of the attractions
in providing aid. Foreign interventions in poor
countries can buttress a government’s prestige and
political legitimacy back home without having to
be accountable for its actions to those on whom it
is having an impact, as it would have to be when
operating in the domestic arena (Chandler 2003).
This brings us to broader issues of donor
accountability, namely to the citizens at either end
of the aid chain.
4 Accountability to citizens: is
results-based management the
answer?
Compared with domestic line departments, such
as health or education, foreign aid agencies are
unusual in the sense that their intended beneficiaries
are neither citizens nor residents whose status in
theory would give them an “organic” stake in the
performance of government agencies and officials.
On the contrary, they are very much outside of the
public revenue streams on which claims for
accountability and entitlement are commonly based.
(Johnson 2005).
Donors have been trying to square this circle
through the introduction of Results-based
Management (RBM) in aid-recipient countries.
Governments at Monterrey agreed that improved
development effectiveness meant focusing on results
and a systematic approach to themonitoring of the
actions of all parties (IMF 2002). Although largely
driven by donor governments’ perceived
accountability requirements to taxpayers at home6
(Saltmarshe et al. 2003), RBM has the apparently
positive effect of donors requiring that as a quid pro
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quo for receiving aid, recipient governments
introduce a similar system in their own country.
The performance information thus acquired serves
the needs of both governments in responding to
citizens’ demands that the public sector deliver
value for money against stated objectives. Thus,
donors and recipients can learn together about what
works and what does not work in terms of effective
aid.
AWorld Bank document concludes that anRBM
approach, based on setting a strategy and then
devolving responsibility for implementation, is
effective when combined with the devolved
organisation’s reporting on its performance against
the strategy. It enhances accountability to taxpayers
and provides the information required for evidence-
based policy.The debate is ongoing about the degree
to which RBM leads to better organisational
performance and/or improved accountability (Roche
andKelly 2003). I suggest, however, that RBMmay
be symptomatic of donors’ current learning
difficulties because it ignores the unequal relations
of power in fixing the strategy and, as I now discuss,
sees all problems as similar.
UnderlyingRBM is a series of assumptions about
the nature of problems.
● There is broad agreement between all parties
concerned on the nature of the problem that the
strategy has been designed to address.
● There is some mutual understanding of what a
solution would look like.
● The problem is bounded in terms of the time
and resources required for its resolution
(Chapman 2002).
Accountability mechanisms based on the citizens’
right to know whether their money has delivered
what was promised works well when problems
appear to be of this kind. For example, theMazdoor
Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) movement in
Rajasthan demands that public officials provide
information about infrastructure projects, such as
schools and wells (Johnson 2005).While the failure
to deliver a school building may not solve the
problem of girls’ illiteracy, we can assume that its
construction will not make the problem worse.
The current model of public policy making is
based on the reduction of problems into separate,
rationally manageable components. It works when
everyone agrees that these are the required elements
for solving a problem but often such an agreement
is absent. While in such circumstances a
government may seek to impose its understanding
of the problem through performancemanagement
systems, the outcome can be disappointing. This
is the case when problems are “unbounded” or
“divergent”.
● There is no clear agreement about exactly what
the problem is.
● There is uncertainty and ambiguity as to how
improvements might be made.
● The problem has no limits in terms of the time
and resources it could absorb (Chapman 2002).
Many of the problems governments must cope
with (and eliminating global poverty would seem
to fit here) are of the unbounded kind. They
therefore require a different approach to planning
and implementing solutions that recognises rather
than ignores the disagreement and uncertainty.
If stakeholders do not have a common view as
to what should be the solution then how and to
whom should a government be accountable for
solving it? I mentioned earlier the idea of
improvisation – shared learning through action.
This recognises that there are different perspectives
about the problem and what counts as success,
unlike RBM that determines in advance, both the
expected result and the kind of evidence accepted
as valid to determine whether that result was
achieved.
RBM is usually attributed to taxpayers growing
increasingly suspicious of their politicians and civil
servants, wanting to know in advance how their
money will be spent and checking afterwards it has
been spent that way (Meier 2003; Pentland 2000).
It may also be a response to the “risk society”.
Operating in a world of paradox and surprise, there
is growing pressure on the public sector to
demonstrate its infallibility through logic, control
and the use of “objective” evidence for decision
making (Beck 1992). The resulting “audit cultures”
(Strathern 2000) havebeen extensively discussed in
Britain and are the subject of a current Economic
and SocialResearchCouncil (ESRC) seminar series.
In relation to learning, such cultures require an
agreement between those in the accountability
relationship about what is acceptable as evidence.
To deliver that evidence, organisations may have to
change the way they work and the values they adhere
Donors’ Learning Difficulties: Results, Relationships and Responsibilities
101
to (Pentland 2000; Power 1996). Thus, RBM can
have a controlling effect.As Inow discuss it can also
create unintended consequences of resistance.
5 RBM: the consequences for
learning
A public administration is often a monopsonistic
supplier of funds. It has the upper hand in defining
what is acceptable knowledge. It not only reshapes
the recipient’s organisation so that it is capable of
delivering the required information but influences
how the recipient describes (gives an account of)
itself (Strathern 2000). Such a process has been
described “colonisation” (Pentland 2000; Power
1996) – a rather sensitive word to use in the context
of the aid relationship.
An alternative effect to “colonisation” is
“decoupling”. This is when an organisation goes
through the ritual of imposed procedures but has
not internalised their logic or the values underlying
them. In this case, themore emphasis onmeasuring
performance, the greater the likelihood the
organisation becomes deviant and secretive
(Pentland 2000, citing Power 1996). In the new
aid relationship, with its aspirations for mutual
accountability, the effects of colonisation and
decoupling undoubtedly manifest themselves
paradoxically and simultaneously, as I experienced
every day when in Bolivia (Eyben 2003; Eyben with
León, forthcoming).
Among recipients, “colonisation” may offer the
possibility of transformative learning – seeing the
world in a new way. On the other hand, it can
encourage what has been termed “regressive”
learning, one of compliance (Vince 2001) or,
conversely what could be termed “resistance
learning” or the “weapons of the weak” in the sense
of power of thedonors generating its own resistance.7
Most organisations in the aid chain are of course
both recipients and donors of funds. I imagine that
these different kinds of learning – transformative,
regressive and resistance – can occur at the
individual, organisational and trans-organisational
level in all parts of the aid chain wheremoney flows
from the Ministry of Finance down to local
government or community-based organisations in
the recipient country.
When regressive or resistance learning occurs
among the recipients, the donor is discouraged from
transformative or “double loop learning” – that is,
learning that leads to fundamentally new ways of
looking at the issue in question (Pasteur 2004).This
is because it reinforces donor claims that they know
what the problem is and have the solution to it.
Thus, they make only single-loop adjustments to
their practice.8 They are only learning in relation to
how they have previously defined theproblem rather
than being open to learning through acting in a state
of admitted ignorance (Lindblom 1990).
One paradox in the aid relationship concerns
the gooddonorship commitment todonor alignment
andharmonisation that can both empower recipient
governments through the reduction of their
transaction costs, and disempower them through
donors ganging up together.9 Monterrey’s
endorsement of results-based management could
reinforce the disempowerment pole of the paradox
by donors establishing what knowledge is acceptable
for defining theproblem and identifying the solution.
Should this occur, recipient governments would
lose their place “in the driving seat”.The imperative
for upward reporting to donors who have used their
power to define the problem and the solution may
reduce recipient governments’ accountability to
their own citizens with potentially different views
on the issue.10
The same effect may manifest itself in projects.
In an exercise on mapping lines of accountability
in a Swiss-funded project, workshop participants
discovered that although the project’s aim had been
to strengthen accountability between local actors,
the strongest accountability link was to the donor
government. In such circumstances, staff time that
could have been devoted to strengthening
responsible horizontal relationships is diverted to
reporting to the donor, the only actor in the project’s
network of relationships that can apply sanctions
if the accountability obligation is not met.11
Finally, of course, donors have sought to
strengthen recipient governments’ downward
accountability through developing civil society
capacity, often via the provision of funds to
international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) to avoid upsetting the government-to-
government relationship. This creates a complex
nest of accountability paradoxes for which space
constraints prevent further discussion.12
In conclusion, I suggest that RBM may have
paradoxical effects. First, it can distort or weaken
recipients’ accountability to their own citizens or
intended end-users because of its underlying
assumption that all problems are bounded. Second,
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
102
it may constrain transformative learning, the kind
of learning required for managing non-bounded
problems.
6 What about the citizens back
home?
A government may not be very accountable for its
aid to its citizens back home either, despite the use
ofRBM. In contrast to their ownhealth or education
services, these citizens have no direct contact with
the world of aid. They must believe what they are
told by those with an interest in the matter –
government and non-governmental aid agencies.
The latter may represent adisinterested constituency,
but the donor government’s power as a major
supplier of funds may limit enthusiasm to criticise
government’s performance and thus help them learn.
The Millennium Project report notes that a
perception of aid being of low quality discourages
citizens from supporting increases in the aid budget
(UN 2005). The proposed response to such
perceptions is to demonstrate what money can
deliver in terms of tangible results: so many bed
nets or other “quick wins”. The public receives a
simplified and, I believe, unhelpful impression of
how aid works.
The reality is that these results are an effect of
aid employees (national and international) building
relationships and learning to work on the basis of
mutual respect with the governments and
communities receiving aid. Their role is rarely
emphasised through fear that taxpayers or voluntary
donors would interpret this as a “transaction cost”
or “administrative overhead”, rather than as people
making a difference. DFID has recently reduced
country office personnel for this reason, because
the Treasury does not perceive them as “frontline
workers”. How can they move from this dilemma
towards mutual learning, gaining citizens’ support,
not by claiming they know what to do but by
admitting that when aid works, it is probably due
to improvisation by people on the spot?
The complex and contingent nature of social
change – and the impossibility of predicting with
certainty that a particular event will lead to a certain
outcome – suggests a possible donor approach:
developing long-term and consistent relations with
recipient organisations, including governments,
which are pursuing a social change agenda that is
compatible with the donor’s own values and
mission. Rather than aiming to achieve a
predetermined, specific real-world change in which
the recipient organisation is treated as an instrument
to that change, the focus of donor effort would be
to support that organisation’s own efforts in a
turbulent policy environment.13
Such a transformationmeans asking citizens in
donor countries to consider the world in a new
light. Those at home campaigning for more aid
money or more debt relief would need to switch
their slogans to investing in relationships rather
than in school buildings.This may encourage wider
citizen interest if governments can demonstrate
that learning through relationships makes taxpayers’
money workmore effectively for their fellow global
citizens at the other end of the aid chain.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that when an organisation uses its
power to avoid accountability to its end-users, it
has no interest in double-loop learning. Such an
organisation, interested in history only insofar as
it confirms it in its own predilections, will be both
ignorant and forgetful. Its power to practise
“historical amnesia” (Foucault 1980) will deafen it
to the voices and views of others. Instead of inviting
their assistance in amutual construction of the past
on which to build a joint future, it ignores their
understanding of the world and through this
exercise of control may incite resistance not
cooperation. I have proposed an alternative that
values differences whereby donors will be better
able to respond to the complex environment in
which aid operates and to which it contributes.
This means a change of mindset. In some
circumstances, a focus on concrete results candeliver
enhanced performance through strengthened
accountability to the end-users. However, used
indiscriminately for all and every kind of situation,
it distorts relationships, renders invisiblemuch that
is needed to be understood, reduces responsibility
and blocks the capacity to learn in an unpredictable
world. The current enthusiasm for RBM, with its
central role for causality (Meier 2003), ignores other
ways of understanding the world and weakens aid
effectiveness.
There would bemore possibility of constructive
donor impact if the single-minded concern for
results were reduced and greater effort were put
into the choice and quality of the relationships on
which donors are (paradoxically) dependent for
their money and advice tomake a difference. They
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would negotiate accountability in terms of mutual
responsibility, recognising and working through
the paradoxes implicit in the gift relationship and
the injustices of history. Finally, they would accept
the psychotherapeutic lesson that you cannot
change others, only yourself.
Donors are already learning some of this.DFID’s
recent policy paper on fragile states (2005)
demonstrates an awareness of the futility of rushing
straight up the hill. It emphasises modest, step-by-
step actions which fit well with a recognition of the
uncertain and contingent environment of
international aid. The same paper recognises that
aid has caused problems in the past and that donors
themselves are part of an aid-recipient country’s
political economy. This is good progress.
We are witnessing greater responsiveness. The
Monterrey agreement tomonitor donors as well as
recipients is beginning to be implemented (Killick
2004).Those donor governments which havemost
embraced rights-based approaches, such as Sweden,
are asking recipient governments to evaluate their
aid programmes. In other cases, recipients are
insisting on it. More donors are being more
transparent about their budgets, including the costs
of their own staff. These and other efforts signal
real concern to promote recipient ownership.
(Eyben and Ferguson 2004).
Nevertheless, a certain powerful worldview,
developed during the era of European expansion,
and reinforced by current global considerations, is
resisting rather than embracing the possibilities for
transformative change offered by paradox and
unpredictability.Donors are finding it difficult even
to learn that they are learning.Thus, in conclusion,
I offer some practical tips for tackling these learning
difficulties.
8 Some learning tips for donors
8.1 Recognise the paradox and improvise
“Muddling through” is sometimes the best way of
making progress, as DFID admits in its new Fragile
States Policy Paper.
8.2 Rethink “performance”
Organisations make a difference not only through
formal interventions related to objectives, but
though the relationships and influence they have
on others, the values they represent and spread,
and how the worth of their intervention is judged
by others (Roche andKelly 2003; Bagic 2004). The
scope of evaluations might include such matters.
8.3 Recognise that the aid relationship has
a history
Making connections to the historical landscape of
power14 from which current practice has developed
not only enriches our understanding but also offers
greater possibility of learning to change and of re-
establishing relationships on amore honest footing.
8.4 Spend time with people living in
poverty
This is good practice for staff from recipient as well
as donor governments. Doing it together is even
better. Paradoxically, as aid agencies focus more on
reducing poverty reduction, practitioners are
spending more time in capital cities negotiating
budget support, and less time in the company of
poor people. The rapidly changing realities of poor
people’s lives and aspirations mean that direct
experience of that reality swiftly becomes dated.
Making assumptions from knowledge based on
experience from long ago can lead to erroneous
conclusions (Irvine et al. 2004).
8.5 Gather honest feedback
This may not be easy, particularly in aid-dependent
countries (O’Dwyer 2005). Nevertheless, it is
remarkable how resistant donor governments are
to even try to establish regular social audits as a
routine 360 degree-type process with their different
stakeholders. Such audits, when well designed, can
trigger significant learning without being excessively
expensive (compared for example with the resources
invested in computerisedmanagement information
system (MIS) programmes). That there is such
strong resistance to their use indicates the challenge
donors still face in admitting to their learning
difficulties.
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Notes
1. Reportedly said by Karl Deutsch and quoted by
Michael Cox at the Millennium Journal conference at
the London School of Economics on 30 October 2004.
See also Chambers’ (1997) argument about how power
deceives.
2. Although I draw largely on my direct experience and
knowledge of the Department for International
Development (DFID) and Whitehall, the argument
that follows also includes reflections from interviews
with staff in the Swedish International Development
Agency (SIDA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Stockholm in March 2004 and feedback from a Swiss
Development Cooperation workshop on accountabili-
ty in Berne in October of that year. I am grateful to Itil
Asmon for commenting on an earlier draft.
3. Recently I was at a meeting between a small number of
civil servants from two different Departments dis-
cussing why Whitehall was not interested in learning.
They unconsciously emphasised the point through
their nervous comments that whatever they said
should not go beyond ‘these four walls’.
4. For example, Bentley and Wilsdon (2003);
Courpasson and Reed (2004); Lindblom (1990); Scott
(1998); Senge (1990).
5. A possibly apocryphal story I have heard in relation to
the current troubled state of Nepal concerns a bilater-
al aid agency’s security instructions to staff that should
they encounter Maoist insurgents while on a project
supervision visit, they should provide budgets,
accounts and any other information that the guerrillas
may require.My informant remarked that the power of
the gun appeared to be making donors more account-
able.
6. Although I am not convinced that ordinary citizens
would not be amenable to the use of other account-
ability mechanisms where they rather than govern-
ment might be more in control. See also Roche and
Kelly (2003: 10–11) on the degree to which the pub-
lic in donor countries will be effectively engaged in
changing the stranglehold of treasuries and audit
offices, who promote accountability in their name.
7. See de Certeau 1988 for a discussion of this matter
developing the Foucauldian idea of power generating
its own resistance.
8. ‘Managing for results is an iterative management
approach. There is constant feedback to the planning
and management process as results are assessed. Based
on constant feedback of performance information
from: audits, management reviews, performance mea-
surement activities and evaluations, the inputs and
activities can be modified and other implementation
adjustments made’ (Meier 2003: 24). This is a classic
description of “single loop learning” by the head of the
RBM unit in the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA).
9. Edgren (2003) notes the conflict in interpretation on
this point in two different SIDA-commissioned studies
on donorship and ownership.
10. I am aware that participatory methods as recommend-
ed for the development of Poverty Reduction Strategies
are intended to address this problem, but see Brock et
al. (2001) for a discussion of the limitations of these
methods in such contexts.
11. See also Carlson and Wohlgemuth (2000).
12. I deal extensively with this issue in Eyben (2003),
Eyben and Ferguson (2004) and Eyben with León
(2005, forthcoming).
13. See the discussion of this point with regard to DFID’s
experience in Brazil in Guimaraes and Larbi-Jones
(2005, forthcoming).
14. I am indebted to Pfohl (2005) for this turn of phrase.
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